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Towards a Privacy Research Roadmap for the Computing 
Community  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Great advances in computing and communication technology are bringing many benefits to 
society, with transformative changes and financial opportunities being created in health care, 
transportation, education, law enforcement, national security, commerce, and social 
interactions.  Many of these benefits, however, involve the use of sensitive personal data, and 
thereby raise concerns about privacy.  Failure to address these concerns can lead to a loss of 
trust in the private and public institutions that handle personal data, and can stifle the 
independent thought and expression that is needed for our democracy to flourish. 
 
This report, sponsored by the Computing Community Consortium (CCC), suggests a roadmap 
for privacy research over the next decade, aimed at enabling society to appropriately control 
threats to privacy while enjoying the benefits of information technology and data science.   We 
hope that it will be useful to the agencies of the Federal Networking and Information Technology 
Research and Development (NITRD) Program as they develop a joint National Privacy 
Research Strategy over the coming months.  The report synthesizes input drawn from the 
privacy and computing communities submitted to both the CCC and NITRD, as well as past 
reports on the topic.     
 
Privacy is a broad topic, encompassing a variety of issues in many different contexts.  Our focus 
is on concerns raised by the collection, sharing, analysis, and use of personal data in 
information systems.   Even with this bounded scope, the privacy concerns in consideration are 
manifold, including (but not limited to) unwanted disclosure of personal information, lack of 
transparency and control around how one’s information is used, and discrimination based on 
personal information. 
 
The research agenda we describe seeks to lead us to a state where: 
 
● We have a rigorous science of privacy that applies across different application domains;  
● We understand the needs, expectations, and incentives of the humans who use 
information systems, and can design systems that are sensitive to them; 
● Privacy technology research and privacy policy objectives are informed by and aligned 
with each other; and 
● We can engineer systems that enable us to enjoy both privacy and the benefits of data 
use to the maximum extent possible, showing that the tradeoff between the two can be 
much less stark than our current approaches offer:  
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To reach this state, we believe that the research strategy needs to:  
 
● Emphasize understanding, defining, and measuring the privacy of information systems: 
A major challenge for privacy research is that there is no single, agreed-upon definition 
of “privacy”; indeed, the term refers to a variety of distinct concerns.  However, for each 
particular privacy concern, it is important  to understand and precisely define the 
objective, evaluate it with scientific rigor, and match it to the requirements of particular 
application domains.  This is a prerequisite for transparency and privacy-by-design that 
should be a priority for privacy research more broadly. 
 
● Recognize and support the many stages and dimensions of privacy research:  The  
pipeline in privacy research starts from foundational work that aims to understand 
phenomena and the range of technological possibilities and limitations, continues on to 
applied research that is directed at specific privacy objectives, and finally to translational 
work that seeks practical impact on particular application domains.   Support is needed 
for research at all of these stages, as well as for ensuring a steady flow of ideas from 
each to the next.   
 
● Enable interdisciplinary research strategies: Developing a science of privacy and 
effective privacy solutions requires a combined understanding of computing technology, 
information, human behavior, and governance mechanisms.  Thus, it is important to 
develop and strengthen structures that encourage interdisciplinary research on privacy.  
At the same time, it should be recognized that multi-disciplinary approaches are also 
appropriate and that some research directions need to mature within a single field before 
crossing disciplinary lines. 
 
● Foster a technology-policy dialogue:  We need a bi-directional conversation that enables 
regulators, lawmakers, standards creators, researchers, and system builders to 
understand what is and is not possible to achieve with technology, and be informed 
about policy objectives related to  privacy properties of systems, procedures, and 
processes.  
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Process Leading to this Report 
 
In Spring 2014, the White House and the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) conducted 90-day reviews of big data and privacy.1  Both reports 
recommend an increased federal investment in privacy research.  Consequently the NITRD 
agencies were tasked with developing a National Privacy Research Strategy (NPRS), which 
should “establish objectives and prioritization guidance for federally-funded privacy research, 
provide a framework for coordinating R&D in privacy-enhancing technologies, and encourage 
multi-disciplinary research that recognizes the responsibilities of the Government, the needs of 
society, and enhances opportunities for innovation in the digital realm.”  To gather community 
input for the NPRS, NITRD issued a Request for Information in September 2014 and held a 
workshop in February 2015.   Following the workshop, the Computing Community Consortium 
(CCC) formed a committee of five researchers to gather additional community input and 
synthesize it into a coherent research agenda.  This report is the result of that effort.  It draws 
upon the Big Data Privacy reports, the responses to the September 2014 RFI, the February 
2015 workshop, and additional community input gathered by the committee.  While the White 
House and PCAST Big Data Privacy reports explain the privacy implications of big data and 
information systems, and near-term policy and technology solutions, the current report has a 
somewhat wider scope (all uses of personal data in information systems, not just “big data”), 
and focuses on objectives for a longer timescale (e.g. a decade) and the research activities 
needed to reach those objectives. 
 
Outline of the Remainder of the Report:  
 
● Section II lists a number of national priority areas and application domains where 
information systems and the use of personal data raises opportunities for great benefit 
as well as threats to privacy.   
● Section III outlines several broad privacy objectives that cut across these application 
domains.   
● Section IV presents and organizes many specific research areas that, together, can help 
us reach the privacy objectives stated in Section III. 
● Section V offers suggestions for encouraging the much-needed interdisciplinary 
research on privacy.    
● Section VI discusses how to enable the outcomes of such research to be translated into 
practice so as to serve the national priorities and application domains of Section II. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 “Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values,” May 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf. 
“Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective,” May 2014, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-
_may_2014.pdf. 
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II. Domains 
 
This section describes a variety of national priorities and application domains for which privacy 
research is important, detailing the benefits of the use of personal data and the risks involved in 
each.   As discussed in the introduction, the privacy research agenda should seek to develop a 
science of privacy that cuts across application domains.  There is also a need for supporting 
more applied, domain-specific research that translates the broad scientific knowledge into 
practical impact within the specific domains. 
 
A. Health Care  
Information systems have the potential to vastly improve health care services; increased 
sharing and use of health and medical data will produce a variety of benefits for this 
sector, including more accurate diagnosis, more personalized and coordinated care, 
more rapid development of new treatments, faster response to distress via novel health-
tracking devices, more effective treatment based on genetic makeup, and lower costs.  
Privacy concerns include disclosure of sensitive health data through sharing or data 
breaches, discrimination in employment or insurance based on medical conditions or 
even genetic predisposition, and continual monitoring of patients outside the healthcare 
context through novel health-tracking devices.  
 
B. Transportation  
Benefits of information technology on transportation can be in reducing congestion, 
preventing accidents, reducing deaths and injuries, increasing fuel efficiency, and saving 
human effort spent on driving.  Privacy concerns come from the tracking of individual 
movements through navigation systems, roadway sensors, traffic cameras, in-car data 
collection, and communications between cars. 
 
C. Law Enforcement and National Security 
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies collect and analyze many different types of 
data (criminal records and non-criminal supplemental information) to create a “virtual 
picture” of individuals to help with solving crimes, preventing attacks, and tracking 
terrorists. The concern is that these organizations collect information en-masse on the 
general population, raising the possibility of unauthorized use and the chilling effects of 
surveillance.  
 
D. Education  
Information technology and data can improve education by enabling adaptive and 
personalized content, measurement of teacher performance, more effective and efficient 
education policy, and tools to assist families in educational choices.  Online courses 
provide vast increases in the availability of education for all learners.  Privacy concerns 
arise from the sensitivity of data about students’ engagement and performance, 
including exposure of student home study habits as recorded by online interfaces. 
 
E. Modern Internet Services 
Modern Internet services, such as search engines, social networks, online video 
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services, and online retailers, have access to a rich array of data that can be used for 
useful purposes, including advanced personalization of content, novel forms of social 
interaction, and connecting people to other people, businesses and government. There 
are also opportunities to use such data for research and other socially beneficial 
purposes (e.g. prevention of disease outbreaks, aid in natural disasters).  Concerns arise 
from use, abuse, and sharing of the data for purposes other than the ones for which it 
was provided, and unfairness or discrimination that can arise from personalized 
services. 
 
F. Modern App Ecosystems 
Devices such as smartphones, web browsers, activity bracelets and their apps provide 
great utility, entertainment, and functionality to users.   The generative ecosystem that 
has evolved for easily creating and distributing apps has led to great innovation, but 
makes it a challenge to ensure that apps respect users’ privacy and security.  In 
particular, it is difficult for users to control the apps’ access to the vast amounts of 
sensitive data stored on the devices and to the various sensors that are built into the 
devices. 
 
G. Internet of Things and Smart Infrastructures 
The internet of things and smart infrastructure – smart buildings, smart homes, smart 
cities – enable improvement of living conditions, productivity, and quality of life.  For 
example, a smart home can detect the occupants present, learn their schedules and 
requirements, and then combine that information with real-time utility prices and smart 
meters to provide efficient and automatic control of appliances.  However, the same 
information can be used to track when individuals are home, which TV programs they 
watch and websites they visit, their sleep schedules, and other behavior.  The risk is the 
exploitation of such data for other purposes such as lawsuits, insurance decisions, 
unwanted advertising, or crime.   
 
H. Financial Sector 
Data from financial institutions can assist regulators in assessing compliance, and allow 
for analysis of trends and forewarn about such dangers as the 2009 financial crisis.  
However, financial data is sensitive not only at the level of individual customers, but also 
at the level of institutions, since it reveals proprietary information about strategies and 
holdings. 
 
I. Open Government Data 
Governments at all levels are releasing large amounts of data in order to increase trust 
and transparency and to enable innovative applications.  However, these data releases 
often relate to sensitive information about citizens, creating a tension between 
governments’ obligations to share data and to respect privacy. 
 
J. Research Data 
As the advancement of knowledge in many fields becomes increasingly data-driven, it is 
important that the data supporting research results be made available for validating and 
6 
extending the findings, and indeed many funding agencies (such as NSF and NIH) have 
adopted policies that mandate sharing of research data.  However, for data on human 
subjects, researchers currently lack adequate tools to protect the privacy of their 
subjects when sharing their data; the traditional approach of deidentification by removing 
identifiers is now known to provide very weak protections. 
 
III. Privacy Objectives and Desired Capabilities 
 
Privacy research has important contributions to make to society in the quest to design, 
operate and regulate information systems that respect a range of privacy values.  First, 
we depend on progress in computer science, social science, and law to enhance our 
ability to protect society’s established privacy values.  Second, researchers in a variety 
of fields have much to contribute to society’s ongoing understanding of the value, 
meaning and practical application of privacy in our information-intensive world.  Privacy 
is neither a unitary nor absolute quality.  Some uses of personal data may both offer 
important economic, scientific, or social value, but at the same time pose privacy risks. 
So engagement with scholars in a variety of fields is especially important to help society 
make decisions and find the appropriate alignment of privacy rights along with other 
social values. 
 
Computing researchers, both working within their disciplines and in increasingly 
important interdisciplinary research projects, can help achieve the key privacy policy 
objectives identified in the White House Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights and the 
Federal Trade Commission report “Protecting Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,” 
namely: data transparency, accountable information use, respect for context, individual 
control over personal data, privacy-by-design, access and correction to personal data, 
fairness, and security.2    
 
To meet these objectives, research on privacy should aim to yield the following 
capabilities in the future: measurement of privacy, social science of privacy, security for 
privacy, engineering of privacy, and policy for privacy.  These capabilities, and the 
privacy objectives they support, are important for all of the application domains 
mentioned in Section II.   We now elaborate on each of these desired capabilities:. 
 
● Measurement of Privacy: we should be able to precisely define what various 
privacy objectives mean for different types of information systems, and be able to 
measure the extent to which the systems meet those objectives. 
 
Measuring the privacy behavior of information systems supports many privacy 
objectives, including individual control, accountability, respect for context, and 
                                                
2 This is an amalgam of the key principles and goals identified by the White House and the FTC. 
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transparency.  In order to ensure that a system provides “individual control,” we 
must identify the presence of personal data in a system such that it can be 
controlled.  To make collection and use of personal data accountable to relevant 
rules, we must have some visibility into the behavior of these systems.  Whether 
a system respects the context in which information was originally collected can 
only be determined by measuring the state of the system at the time of collection 
and then throughout the use of that data.  
 
Measurement is particularly important to achieve the policy objective of 
transparency.  If the collection, flow and use of personal data is not at least 
partially visible either to a person or a machine, then there is no way to assess or 
control the privacy consequences of any system.  In the past, the policy 
requirement of transparency, found in all leading privacy legal instruments,3 has 
been understood largely as a value directed at individuals - to enable informed 
choices about individual privacy relationships.  Today we understand that 
individual choice mechanisms may not be effective means of protecting privacy 
because of imbalances in bargaining power and high transaction costs. 
Computational measurement capability opens up the possibility of supplementing 
the already over-taxed cognitive capacity of humans with machine-assisted 
reasoning and analysis. 
 
Scalable transparency and measurement techniques will be particularly important 
when systems use personal data in new ways, so that society can develop 
informed perspectives on the risk and desirability of such uses.  Thus, we need 
tools and techniques that move beyond often-imprecise approximations of what 
might be happening with personal data in a system, toward more formalized, 
rigorous and well-founded measures of exposure and risk associated with 
collection, transfer and use of personal data.  Effective privacy measurement 
techniques will enable us to replace paper-driven transparency mechanisms 
such as human-readable policies with scalable computational techniques.  
 
In addition, there is a need to enable measurements when there is partial 
transparency.  When companies do not want to disclose their algorithms for 
proprietary reasons we would still need to be able to determine the privacy 
                                                
3 Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems, July 1973,” May 2015, 
https://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/default.html. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 (5 U.S.C. § 
552a). European Union (EU) Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980, revised 2013). 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonal
data.htm. 
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exposure.  This partial transparency creates a much more challenging setting for 
solving the measurement problem. 
 
Furthermore, it is vital to investigate the question of whether measuring a 
system’s privacy exposure as a stand-alone entity is sufficient or whether we 
should take into account the secondary exposures which occur by crossing 
information with other available content. 
 
● Social Science of Privacy: we should understand the privacy needs and 
expectations of the humans who use information systems, the institutional 
dynamics of the organizations that use personal data, and how larger social and 
economic forces relate to privacy. 
 
Effective privacy protection depends not only on public policy but also on 
nuanced understanding of human behavior to help system designers tailor their 
designs to respond to behavioral dynamics.  Both policy makers and system 
designers will depend on insight from behavioral sciences — such as economics, 
institutional psychology, sociology — to tune both lawmaking and technology 
design.  This is important for achieving all privacy policy objectives, because 
privacy is ultimately about the effect of the use of personal data on the human 
users of information systems.  But it is particularly important for individual control, 
access and correction, and respect for context, which refer directly to the 
interaction of users with information systems, and their expectations when doing 
so.   For example, we need to be able to answer questions such as:  
 
● How do user interface design patterns influence privacy choices made by 
users? 
● How do different uses of personal data or system design decisions 
increase or decrease the risk of chilling effects on individual participation 
and expression in online environments?  
● How do different privacy laws and social norms regarding personal data 
change the distribution of the economic value derived from the use of 
personal data? 
 
● Security for Privacy: we should understand the relationship between security and 
privacy, and be able to secure information systems from unauthorized access to 
personal information. 
 
Security is closely related to but not synonymous with privacy.  Protecting privacy 
requires being able to secure personal data from unauthorized access and use.  
However, while necessary, security alone is hardly sufficient for privacy.  
Observing the history of privacy intrusions over the last several years is enough 
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to illustrate that simply protecting data from outside intruders is not sufficient to 
protect privacy, as some privacy harms come from those who are actually 
authorized to access data in some fashion or another.  
 
Design of secure systems themselves can raise privacy risks and challenging 
policy trade-offs.  Some approaches to detecting and analyzing security threats 
depend on collecting larger volumes of personal data.  Of course, securing 
systems is important to privacy protection.  At the same time, more research is 
required to learn how to collect threat intelligence and attribution data without 
compromising privacy interests of innocent users of systems under investigation. 
 
While computer security has been studied for a long time, many breaches of 
confidential personal data still come from failures of security.  The causes of 
these failures include issues with the usability of security technology and the 
increasing complexity of the systems that we need to secure, and thus continued 
research on computer security and the transition of its results to practice remains 
important for privacy.  Furthermore, there is a need to examine whether we can 
tolerate solutions that present a loss in efficiency but provide better privacy 
guarantees.  
 
● Engineering of Privacy: we should be able to design and build information 
systems that meet privacy objectives while allowing us to enjoy the beneficial 
uses of personal data. 
 
Privacy policy makers and scholars have called for privacy-by-design — 
techniques to build privacy protection into the initial design of systems, rather 
than trying to retrofit designs or manage privacy purely through human-controlled 
policies.  Large numbers of developers are now designing systems that handle 
personal data.  These developers need well-designed, reliable, and modular  
software, hardware, and services that have privacy awareness built in.  For 
example, we need tools that allow for data analysis while minimizing exposure or 
inappropriate use of personal data, that log use of personal data and assess 
those uses against formally specified rules, that track the provenance and 
onward flows of personal data, and that offer individual users meaningful 
transparency and control of how their data is used.  Hardware design, especially 
in embedded systems that are difficult to modify as well as in general-purpose 
hardware technologies that support protected execution environments, may also 
have privacy impact and can benefit from advance thinking about personal 
information handling as well. 
 
Being able to engineer information systems that enable meeting the many 
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privacy policy objectives requires significant advances in basic research 
(including on measurement of privacy, the social science of privacy, and security, 
as discussed above, and the many other areas discussed in Section IV below), 
as well as substantial investment in the transition to practice (discussed in 
Section VI below).  
 
● Policy for Privacy: we should be able to design effective laws, regulations, 
policies, and best practices regarding the use of personal data in information 
systems in a way that recognizes the unique capabilities and limitations of 
information systems. 
 
Neither technology nor policy on its own will be effective in meeting privacy 
objectives.  Just as technological systems need to be engineered with an 
understanding of the policy objectives, privacy laws, rules, regulations and best 
practices need to be developed with an understanding of what is technologically 
possible and impossible.  To guide the development of a broad policy approach 
to privacy objectives, we need research that can answer questions such as 
these: 
 
● How are different legal and regulatory approaches likely to meet privacy 
objectives given the unique nature of today’s information systems and the 
global reach of many information infrastructures? 
● What can we learn about developing privacy policy from other regulatory 
areas such as environmental policy, human rights law, financial services 
regulation, and telecommunications regulation? 
● What can we learn from the way actual institutions are implementing the 
wide variety of existing privacy policies? 
● What are the limits of technology and what would need to be enforced by 
laws? 
 
Answers to these kinds of questions will require an ongoing dialogue between 
policymakers, technologists, practitioners, and scholars from a variety of 
disciplines.  Policymakers at regulatory agencies such as the FTC and FCC 
should find ways to engage technologists and scholars in research that will 
inform policy decisions, perhaps working with funding agencies such as NSF. 
 
IV. Research Directions 
 
In this section, we describe a number of research areas where substantial advances are needed 
to reach the capabilities discussed in Section III.  Collectively, these research directions involve 
a wide variety of disciplines, which include computing and mathematical sciences, social 
sciences, and law and policy.   Meeting privacy policy objectives requires not only advances 
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within the individual disciplines, but a significant amount of interdisciplinary work that integrates 
insights from multiple areas.  Similarly, we need both basic research to develop a science of 
privacy that cuts across application domains, as well as applied research that translates this 
science into practical tools that fit the particulars of a given application.  Sections V and VI of the 
report provide suggestions on how to foster interdisciplinary work and enable the transition to 
practice, respectively. 
 
A. Definitions and Frameworks  
 
A major challenge for privacy research is finding clear and convincing specifications for goals, 
because privacy refers to a variety of different concerns associated with the use of personal 
data.  Moreover, it is often difficult to draw a clear distinction between the uses of personal data 
that we wish to enable in a given context (“utility”) and that which we wish to limit (“privacy”).   
 
For the success of the privacy research agenda, it is extremely important to overcome these 
difficulties, and provide precise definitions of different privacy properties in a variety of contexts.  
In addition to providing the foundation for a science of privacy, good definitions serve as an 
interface between policy objectives in application domains and particular solutions or 
technologies.  That is, they allow us to separate the question of whether the definition meets the 
needs of particular application domains and policy objectives from whether a particular 
technology satisfies the definition.   Precise definitions allow the privacy properties of 
technologies to be evaluated in a scientifically rigorous manner, whether empirically or through 
mathematical proof. 
 
Some successes of definitional work in privacy are the mathematically rigorous definitions of 
security and privacy properties in cryptography (such as for secure multiparty computation), and 
the definition of differential privacy.  These definitions correspond to particular notions of utility 
(computing arbitrary functions in the case of secure multiparty computation vs. computing global 
statistical properties in the case of differential privacy), particular notions of privacy (hiding 
everything except the function output vs. hiding individual-level data), and particular trust 
models (everyone holds their own data vs. a trusted curator holding all data).  These definitions 
consider an adversarial threat, but it can also make sense to consider game-theoretic definitions 
that model the incentives of a potential attacker. 
 
While there have been some such successes, there remain many challenges for definitional 
work in privacy.  Most privacy objectives currently lack sufficiently precise definitions.  Even in 
the success cases, the interpretation of the definitions in relation to a policy objective can be 
subtle (e.g. can revealing the output of a function already allow for a privacy compromise?), 
reflecting a greater need for engagement between researchers with definitional expertise, 
policymakers, and domain experts.   Another issue that poses difficulties for many privacy 
definitions is composability: how does a privacy-protective system that satisfies a particular 
definition interact with a complex environment, with other systems and sources of data?  
Indeed, many unexpected compromises of privacy in the past have come from failure to take 
into account additional sources of data that might be available to an attacker. 
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Finding definitions that are mathematically precise, computationally realizable,  meet policy 
objectives, and satisfy the needs of applications can involve numerous disciplines, including 
computer science, statistics, mathematics, law, philosophy, economics, psychology, and the 
individual application domains.  Research on definitions contributes primarily to developing our 
capabilities for measurement of privacy.  
 
B. Measurement 
 
To solve the problem, we must understand the problem.  In the realm of privacy, this requires 
new research on measuring how information about individuals is collected and shared today 
and understanding the impact on the victims of privacy violations. This includes basic research 
on new analytical and measurement technologies, as well as applied, empirical research on 
measuring information leakage in deployed systems.  In general, it is difficult to measure both 
the benefits and harms of information sharing.  Developing tools that can assess and measure 
privacy risks and potential harms requires new research. 
 
Specific research topics include design and implementation of techniques for detecting and 
measuring flows of personal information with only black-box access to systems handling this 
information and techniques for measuring what is revealed about users by systems that learn 
from users’ data (for example, recommender systems and other systems based on aggregates 
of personal data). This includes the study of “re-identification attacks” against aggregated data, 
i.e., any information about a dataset that depends on a large number of individuals, in contrast 
to tabular datasets where one record corresponds to one individual.  A more complete, 
quantitative understanding of the risks of aggregate data is crucial to advance the field of 
privacy.   
 
Today, information about individuals is scattered across multiple organizations and data 
holders. We need research on tools that can help individuals first discover all information 
pertaining to themselves, and, second, assess whether this information is accurate. 
 
Last, but certainly not least, it is essential to understand the real-world impact of privacy 
violations on the human victims. Research agendas here could involve better engagement with 
at-risk communities, such as activists, targets of "doxing" and other cyber bullying, domestic 
violence victims, etc. 
 
Research on measurement of privacy will benefit from contributions and methodologies from 
disciplines such as sociology (and other social sciences) and biomedical research.   
 
C. Algorithms, Statistics, and Machine Learning 
 
Many of the benefits of data come from the application of algorithms, statistics, machine 
learning to gain insights about populations (whether of customers, citizens, medical patients, or 
research subjects) and to then share or use those insights for the benefit of society, individuals, 
or companies.  This raises several different privacy issues and needs for additional research: 
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● The statistics or model that results from the analysis can disclose inappropriate 
information about inputs (i.e. training data) used in the analysis.  
 
This threat may seem counterintuitive, because a statistical model is supposed to be a 
result of a population-level analysis, but it has been demonstrated that even seemingly 
aggregate statistics can reveal detailed information about individuals.  (See also Section 
IV B on Measurement, above.)  The past decade of theoretical research on differential 
privacy has showed that in principle, we can often protect against such threats with little 
loss to utility.  But for this body of work to have a more substantial impact on practice, 
many theoretical and practical challenges need to be overcome, such as (a) supporting 
real-world data workflows with cleaning and preprocessing, and iterative model fitting, 
(b) providing utility guarantees in the language of empirical science (p values and 
confidence intervals), (c) developing algorithms that provide higher utility, perhaps by 
relaxing the worst-case notions of privacy and utility that are typically used, (d) managing 
privacy loss over time (over many data releases and many analysts), and (e) 
development of programming languages and tools that allow for the easy construction of 
differentially private algorithms without expert involvement.  
 
● Common approaches to data analysis require collecting all the data in a single place, 
which incentivizes greater collection and centralization of data, and increases the risk of 
disclosure through a data breach, subpoena, or other means. 
 
To address the concern, more research (both theoretical and practical) is needed on 
privacy-preserving distributed and dynamic data analysis that does not require storing all 
data in one place.  Secure multiparty computation (from Section IV D on Crypotgraphy, 
below) is a powerful tool for this, which is gradually becoming more practical and can be 
combined with concepts such as differential privacy.  Another approach to avoiding 
storing lots of sensitive data in one place is to design privacy-protective methods of 
performing one-shot data releases (after which the original data can be deleted).  The 
traditional approach of anonymization by removing identifiers is now understood to 
provide very weak privacy protections, so instead we should seek rich statistical 
summaries (such as generating synthetic datasets) that meet formal privacy definitions 
such as differential privacy.   There are some promising theoretical results along these 
lines, but more research is needed to make them practical. 
 
● Algorithms that take actions with respect to individuals, for example product 
recommendations or loan decisions, raise issues of fairness, discrimination, and 
transparency.    
 
For example, an algorithm could have “learned” (from its data) to target credit cards with 
higher interest rates to disadvantaged groups, and little justification for its targeting 
decisions might be found by inspecting its code (which might simply be a vector of 
numerical parameters learned during training).  Compared to the issues mentioned 
above, there has been less mathematical and computer science work on this problem so 
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far, so finding good definitions and approaches remains an important challenge for 
privacy research.   
 
Research on these topics requires interdisciplinary collaboration between theoretical computer 
scientists, statisticians, empirical data scientists from application domains, computer systems 
and programming languages researchers, economists, other social scientists, and legal 
scholars.  The research contributes primarily to our capability for engineering privacy. 
 
D. Cryptography  
 
Cryptography provides many tools for enabling privacy and confidentiality of data, starting with 
basic cryptographic primitives such as encryption and ranging all the way to advanced 
functionalities such as secure multiparty computation, privacy-preserving data mining, search on 
encrypted data, oblivious RAMs, functional encryption, mix nets, anonymous credentials, and at 
the extreme, new tools such as fully homomorphic encryption and program obfuscation.  
 
Some of the advanced technologies provide privacy by distributing the data, the computation, or 
the keys.  That is, various parts of the computation elements are held by different parties and 
via this distribution privacy guarantees are obtained. 
 
Issues that need to be examined include: 
 
● The efficiency and usability of privacy-enhancing cryptographic algorithms.  Design of 
protocols needs to be done with an eye to efficiency.  Looking at the history of computer 
security, there were times when users and industry did not want to pay performance 
costs in order to achieve better security.  Over time, security breaks motivated the 
introduction of better security, provided that performance costs were reasonable.  In the 
context of privacy, we must similarly focus on creating the most efficient algorithms 
possible and providing solutions with good usability.  Furthermore, through 
interdisciplinary research with social science, we need to understand what users and 
companies will consider as acceptable tradeoffs in efficiency and usability in order to 
provide privacy. 
● In what cases do cryptographic solutions address issues that are genuinely of concern in 
application domains?  Answering this question requires interdisciplinary research 
between cryptographers and domain experts to understand and model both the utility 
and privacy requirements.  For example is a solution that hides the inputs and the 
computation but exposes the final result sufficient?  What types of functionality and 
privacy assurances can be offered via cryptographic tools?  The last point would involve 
research regarding definitions and measurements of privacy to assess what levels of 
privacy are offered by any given solution.  Furthermore, there is a need to find better 
ways to communicate what specific solutions offer. 
● How do cryptographic techniques allow law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
access only data that they need from a large database?  One approach is to use secure 
multiparty computation, possibly tailored to the specific queries at hand (e.g. set 
intersection).  The greatest challenge on this front is to provide solutions that manage to 
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balance privacy with national security, and that are compatible with legal oversight 
mechanisms (such as warrants issued by courts).  This requires interdisciplinary 
research with law and policy, as well as experts in law enforcement and intelligence.   
● Defining models of privacy/information leakage.  In order to achieve sufficient efficiency, 
we may have to resort to solutions that are not “perfect”.  That is, we may need to relax 
typical theoretical models to obtain practical performance at the  expense of some 
leakage of information.  Research along these lines needs to define appropriate models, 
design and analyze protocols and measure their leakage, and determine whether such 
solutions are still appropriate for deployment. 
 
Cryptography alone is not sufficient for developing robust privacy technologies.  It is an 
essential piece of the puzzle, but not the only one.  In particular, cryptographic techniques 
fundamentally depend on the security of the computer systems using them.  Thus, research on 
cryptography and secure systems should work together towards the development of end-to-end 
privacy solutions.  
 
E.  Systems 
 
Systems research is a core discipline within computer science that focuses on the design and 
implementation of computer software and hardware.  Personal data is collected, stored, 
processed, and analyzed by computing systems. Therefore, it is not possible to meaningfully 
ensure privacy unless all levels of the system stack are not just “privacy-aware,” but incorporate 
privacy protection at the fundamental design level. 
 
System developers should aim to design and implement systems that provide precisely stated, 
verifiable privacy guarantees. This requires research on tools and methods for checking and 
certifying that systems use personal information in ways that respect privacy expectations and 
(where appropriate) satisfy mathematical properties such as differential privacy or other 
measures of policy conformance.  Techniques that can help achieve this goal include program 
analysis methods for various kinds of information flow properties and privacy policy languages 
that are usable by legal experts, yet have precise semantics that system developers can use to 
restrict and provide accountability for how their code operates on personal information of users. 
 
If privacy requirements and policies describing permitted and prohibited data uses are specified 
precisely, trusted hardware can help build trustworthy execution and data handling 
environments to serve as an alternative to emerging cryptographic tools such as fully 
homomorphic encryption and obfuscation. 
 
Protecting collected data from abuse requires research on systems that can (1) attach policy 
conditions to data, (2) track disclosure while ensuring compliance with privacy policies, and (3) 
track data provenance — where and from whom the data was collected and for what purpose 
(in cloud-based environments in particular, it is essential to be able to reliably identify owners of 
information).  Systems handling sensitive data should support accountable systems techniques 
that enable trustworthy auditing of data collection and data use. 
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Modern communication systems, networks, and protocols often fail to protect privacy of 
individuals who use them.  Research is needed on new technologies for anonymous, 
censorship-resistant, and “metadata-hiding” communications, as well as integrating support for 
privacy into core Internet infrastructure such as DNS. 
 
Researchers pursuing core systems research should be encouraged to take into account 
privacy policies and regulations; usability and human factors, which will be critically important 
when these systems are deployed; and how the data is used in key application domains, 
including but not limited to social sciences, biology and medicine, economics, and law.  
Research on systems aspects of privacy contributes primarily to our capability for engineering of 
privacy. 
 
F: Usability and human behavior  
  
Individuals often lack awareness about how and by whom their data is being collected, the 
privacy consequences of their actions, and the tools available to protect themselves.  In 
addition, usability issues limit the effectiveness of many tools that have been introduced to help 
individuals protect their digital privacy.  Despite a growing stream of research into usable 
privacy over the past decade, we have seen only modest improvements in the usability of 
commercially-available privacy tools.  To improve the usability of privacy tools requires first 
gaining a better understanding of the mental models, workflows, expectations, and privacy 
needs of a diverse set of users from different cultures, age groups, and backgrounds.  We also 
need to study the complexity and diversity of people’s privacy preferences and concerns, what 
people are capable of, and how different privacy interfaces and technologies impact their 
decisions and behaviors.  Further research is needed on how to codify data practices and user 
privacy preferences, how to convey data practices and privacy risk to users in a meaningful and 
actionable way, and how to reduce the burden associated with privacy decision making.  We 
also need to gather empirical data on the privacy harms that people face in the real world to 
inform the development of mitigations that will address these actual harms.  Finally, 
interdisciplinary collaboration is needed to develop more usable privacy tools, grounded in 
knowledge of human behavior, that leverage machine learning techniques to automate privacy 
decision making. 
 
We elaborate on a few example directions for research in this area: 
  
● Cognitive and behavioral analysis of privacy decisions. Further research is required to 
better understand cognitive and behavioral biases and other factors related to privacy 
decisions and develop tools and approaches that take into consideration, or even 
counter, those factors which may bias decision-making. Privacy decisions are difficult for 
people to make for several reasons, including incomplete and asymmetric information 
regarding data usage, and limited mental resources to evaluate all possible options and 
consequences of their actions. In daily interactions, people make privacy decisions often 
based on heuristics, shortcuts, feelings, and emotions. Such heuristics can prove quite 
successful most of the time — but can also lead to suboptimal behaviors or regrettable 
mistakes. Behavioral economics and decision research have analyzed which decision 
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making hurdles individuals face when making privacy decisions and how emotions and 
cognition can influence disclosure behavior. More recently, a growing body of work has 
started examining how interfaces and technology could be designed to counteract 
biases responsible for regrettable privacy decisions.  
 
● Semi-automating privacy settings. Machine learning techniques have been used to help 
derive privacy profiles that can be used to significantly reduce the number of privacy 
decisions individuals have to make and the number of privacy settings users have to 
configure manually.  User-oriented machine learning techniques can also be developed 
to help users refine their privacy settings, leveraging user feedback to suggest 
modifications to these settings.  Additional research in this area may result in 
approaches to privacy settings configuration that is significantly less burdensome and 
more accessible to users. 
 
● Semi-automating understanding of privacy policies.  Machine learning, natural language 
processing, and crowdsourcing are being used to develop techniques aimed at semi-
automatically understanding website privacy policies.  Such techniques offer the 
prospect of automatically (or semi-automatically) understanding key aspects of a natural 
language privacy policy and summarizing its most salient elements to users, possibly in 
a personalized fashion.  The output of such functionality could also be used to populate 
formal models of privacy policies, which in turn could be used to verify compliance with 
relevant laws and regulations and identify inconsistencies with a site’s actual practices. 
 
Research in these areas requires interdisciplinary interaction between social scientists, human-
computer interaction researchers, and machine learning researchers.  It contributes most 
directly to our capabilities for understanding the social science of privacy and engineering of 
privacy. 
 
G: Economics 
 
Many of the benefits and harms of collecting, analyzing, sharing, and using data about 
individuals are economic in nature.  For example, the Internet offers many tools for more 
efficient job matching (search engines, social networks, microblogging platforms), but these also 
increase the potential for labor market discrimination based on job-seekers’ online presence.  
The lens of economics can help us in understanding such tensions and tradeoffs around privacy 
and in developing tools that can be employed to achieve socially desirable outcomes.  
 
Concrete research questions around economics and privacy include the following: 
 
● To what extent will advancements in data analytics and increasing amounts of consumer 
data be used to increase societal welfare, and to what extent, instead, will those 
technologies and data cause mainly a reallocation of economic surplus from data 
subjects to data holders? 
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● To what extent can privacy-enhancing technologies be deployed in manners that 
stimulate economic growth at the same time as allowing for privacy protection? 
 
● What are the incentives of stakeholders (such as consumers, companies, and potential 
adversaries) that impact their privacy-relevant decisions and how can we affect those 
incentives through the design of economic mechanisms (markets), the introduction of 
privacy-enhancing technologies, and regulation? 
 
● Can we augment the traditional tools of market design and mechanism design from 
game theory with notions and tools from privacy research, so that privacy concerns need 
not interfere with the behavior of agents or the social welfare attained by these economic 
systems? 
 
Research in these areas can draw upon economics, behavioral science, computer science, and 
law and policy, and contributes most directly to our understanding of the social science of 
privacy and to policy for privacy. 
 
H: Privacy and Society 
 
Society’s notion of privacy is related in laws, social practice, and the shape of the various 
institutions governing legal, social and cultural norms regarding personal data.  Therefore, our 
understanding of the nature of privacy, and its ongoing evolution, depends on research into the 
law, politics, philosophy, sociology and anthropology of privacy.  Research on the meaning and 
value of privacy should not merely consider choices relative to the status quo, but also be open 
to a complete reinvention of the means by which we store, share, buy, sell, track, compute on, 
and draw conclusions from potentially sensitive data.  At the same time, it should prepare us for 
a variety of future scenarios that may arrive through a combination of technological, social, 
political, and economic forces.  For example, if sensitive information about individuals becomes 
pervasively available, how can we ensure that it is used only in appropriate and fair ways?    
 
A combination of disciplines is necessary in order to reflect the full range of society’s privacy 
landscape.  Legal scholarship can contribute both to the historical foundations of privacy and to 
an understanding of how different regulatory mechanisms may be more or less effective for 
addressing certain privacy challenges.  Today’s information privacy questions also require 
insight into the unique challenges technological change can pose to legal systems. Philosophy 
and social theory have already shown that they can offer valuable critical perspective on our 
cultural notions of privacy.  Political scientists can help understand the behavior of different 
governmental institutions with respect to privacy values.  And sociology, anthropology, together 
with those who specialize in Science, Technology and Society, all have vital roles to play in 
providing a well-grounded picture of the institutional, cultural role of privacy in human societies. 
 
Research on privacy and society contributes most directly to our understanding of the social 
science of privacy and to policy for privacy. 
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V. Fostering interdisciplinary work 
 
As the research directions in the previous section indicate, developing a science of privacy and 
effective privacy solutions requires a combined understanding of computing technology, 
information, human behavior, and governance mechanisms.  Thus, it is important to develop 
and strengthen structures that encourage interdisciplinary research on privacy.  We have a 
number of suggestions along these lines: 
 
● There need to be more workshops and conferences where scholars and practitioners 
from different disciplines and domains can gather to exchange ideas, break down 
language barriers, and start collaborations.  The annual Privacy Law Scholars 
Conference (PLSC) is an excellent example, bringing law and policy researchers 
together with computer scientists and social scientists, but it is already stretched in its 
capacity and scope.  The Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) fosters 
interaction between human-computer interaction researchers and security and privacy 
researchers. The Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS) solicits papers 
from many disciplines, but mostly receives submissions from researchers in the more 
technical privacy areas. The International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) 
conferences attract mostly practitioners and few scholars. More venues are needed to 
foster interdisciplinary discussion. 
● Designated research funding can incentivize and support interdisciplinary work.   
Workshops and seed funding can enable investigators to identify and develop potential 
collaborations in a bottom-up manner before having to submit a larger, long-term 
proposal.   
● It is often difficult for researchers or practitioners to navigate the research literature in 
other disciplines. This can be remedied by encouraging more papers that systematize 
the results and unsolved problems from a particular area in a form that is accessible and 
understandable to outsiders, as well as identify problems that could benefit from other 
disciplines’ insights. We also need more multidisciplinary publication venues that 
welcome such papers.  
● The department-centered hiring and promotion process within academia can also 
present challenges for the career development of interdisciplinary researchers.  
Increased support for interdisciplinary research centers can help address this concern. 
 
While interdisciplinary engagement is very important for privacy research, we should also 
recognize that many fundamental contributions to privacy originate within single disciplines and 
need time to mature before crossing disciplinary lines.  Thus, strengthened support for 
interdisciplinary research should not come at the expense of intradisciplinary work. 
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VI. Transition to Practice 
 
Transition of privacy research to practice is critically important and likely to have a large positive 
impact on users, organizations, corporations, and governments.  This requires several types of 
efforts: engagement and education, bridging the gap between research results and working, 
deployed products, and creating funding models and structures that facilitate this transition. 
 
Education and engagement should be directed at several different audiences: 
 
● System builders who need to be integrating privacy technologies, algorithms, etc. into 
their apps, systems software, enterprise software, operating systems, data processing 
and data analysis systems, etc. To bring industry to the table, it is also important to 
explore organizational mechanisms that can help introduce privacy and data ethics into 
corporate decision making processes.  Coordination activities should help “bridge the 
chasm” between the research community and operational users of computing systems.  
More systematization of research results can make them more accessible to potential 
users and help these users find appropriate technologies for their problems. 
● Regulators, policy makers, and lawmakers.  In particular, it is important to make 
academic research outcomes accessible to policy makers and set appropriate 
expectations as to what is and is not achievable with the current state of the art in 
technology.  System designers also need help understanding whether designs satisfy 
privacy policy objectives and legal requirements. 
● Students (our future workforce).  Workforce education is one of the key mechanisms for 
disseminating research results and influencing privacy practices in industry and 
government.  Basic privacy engineering skills should be taught to all undergraduate and 
graduate computer science students.  In addition, specialized graduate programs in 
privacy engineering can help prepare students for roles as privacy engineers. 
● The public.  The public needs to be educated about privacy risks, as well as the 
capabilities and limitations of privacy protection technologies.  And, system designers 
should be supported in the application of HCI techniques that will help them understand 
what individual users and society at large needs from systems that handle personal 
data. 
 
For bridging the gap between research results and deployed products, we need more funding 
models that encourage collaboration between privacy researchers and practitioners in specific 
application domains (such as those described in Section II).  Such translational research should 
be supported in addition to (rather than in place of) the many basic research efforts that are also 
needed to achieve our privacy objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
Appendix 
 
A committee of five computer science researchers wrote this document in April of 2015.  It is a 
research road map for the privacy community generated from previous reports on the topic of 
privacy and individual and group responses to a CCC request to the community that was made 
in February of 2015 and a Request for Information (RFI)-National Privacy Research Strategy 
that was made in September of 2014.  The Computing Community Consortium edited the 
report.  Special thanks to Tal Rabin and Salil Vadhan for leading this effort.  
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